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NOTES
EVIDENCE - PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF UNANSWERED QUESTION
During the course of a trial for murder the district attorney
asked a state's witness whether or not the defendant had been
given a lie detector test. Defense objected to the question and
the district attorney stated that he would "withdraw it if any
objection were made." The objection was sustained, but a mo-
tion by the defense for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecu-
tion had, in effect, commented on the accused's failure to take
the stand was overruled. The court did not instruct the jury
relative to the matter and the district attorney's question was
never answered. On appeal from conviction, held, affirmed. Al-
though it is reversible incurable error for the district attorney
to call to the attention of the jury by direct statement or plain
inference the fact that the defendant has not testified, the ques-
tion here involved cannot be construed as a reference to that fact.
State v. Stahl, 236 La. 362, 107 So.2d 670 (1958).
The majority of common law jurisdictions prohibit comment
on the failure of an accused to testify.' A minority of the states
hold that such comment cannot be cured by instruction from the
court.2 This latter position has been adopted by Louisiana.3 Al-
though the argument has been made that the prohibition against
commenting on the accused's failure to take the stand was abol-
ished with the enactment of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure in 1928,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court has found such a
second offense was not consummated when the former prosecution was initiated;
or
"(2) the former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed
or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the
defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal,
final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a
'fact which must be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant
is subsequently prosecuted."
1. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 146, 147 (12th ed. 1955). See Annot.,
84 A.L.R. 784 (1933).
2. Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 98 So. 613 (1924) ; Quinn v. People, 123 Ill.
333, 15 N.E. 46 (1888) ; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555 (1868) ; Elliott v. Com-
monwealth, 172 Va. 595, 1 S.E.2d 273 (1939) ; 1 WHARTON EVIDENCE § 146 (12th
ed. 1955).
3. State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d 130 (1951) ; State v. Richardson,
175 La. 823, 144 So. 587 (1932); State v. Sinigal, 138 La. 469, 70 So. 478
(1915) ; State v. Marceaux, 50 La. Ann. 1137, 24 So. 611 (1898) ; The Work of
the Loui8iana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term - Criminal Precedure, 13
LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 326, 337 (1953).
4. The argument is: (1) that Act 29 of 1886, Act 185 of 1902, and Act 41 of
1904, in dealing with the competency of the accused as a witness, contained a pro-
vision that his failure to testify should not be construed for or against him; (2)
further that Act 157 of 1916 provided that the neglect or refusal of the accused
to testify should create no presumption against him; (3) since Article 461 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure superseded the 1916 act and provides simply that "a
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prohibition in the State Constitution.5 The motion for a mistrial
in the instant case was grounded upon the case of State v.
Hoover.6 In that case the district attorney remarked that the
manner in which the defendant observed and discussed with
counsel certain photographs of the scene of the crime showed
that he was familiar with the actual scene, rather than just the
photographs. The opinion, authored by Justice Moise, found no
uncertainty in the implication which flowed from the district at-
torney's statements. The court said that the remarks, though
made without malice, "infringed the defendant's constitutional
privilege against circumstantially forced self incrimination,
which the defendant had to cure, if he so desired, by the waiving
of his constitutional right not to take the stand, as provided in
Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of 1921, and likewise by
the provisions of the Criminal Code, Art. 461." 7 However, only
three of the seven Justices were of the opinion that the remarks
made by the district attorney were a comment on the defendant's
failure to take the stand. Other members of the court based their
decision to grant a new trial on other grounds.8 It follows, there-
fore, that the Hoover opinion is of questionable authority to sus-
tain a result contrary to that reached in the instant case. It is
submitted that the instant case was correctly decided on the point
that there was no comment on the failure of the defendant to
person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a compe-
tent witness," (4) therefore the prohibition against commenting on an accused's
failure to take the stand was thereby removed. An attempt further to strengthen
this argument is made by citing paragraph 15 of the Redactor's explanation of
Article 461 in LA. CODE CRIM. LAW AND PROC. ANN. xvii (Dart, 1942), wherein
the Redactors stated that their intention was to eliminate the rule prohibiting the
district attorney from commenting on the accused's failure to take the stand. See
Justice Hawthorne's dissenting opinion in State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d
130 (1951), and his concurring opinion in State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So.2d
137 (1951), to this effect. However, it would seem that the fallacy of this argu-
ment is aptly demonstrated in a noteworthy opinion by Chief Justice Fournet in
the Bentley case, in which he points out that, although the Redactors sought to
eliminate the rule prohibiting comment by placing express grants to that effect
in Articles 384 and 385, the legislature rejected and deleted the portions of these
articles designed to accomplish the Redactor's purpose.
5. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; State v. Hoover, 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d 130 (1951).
6. 219 La. 872, 54 So.2d 130 (1951).
7. Id. at 873, 54 So.2d at 131.
8. Chief Justice Fournet delivered a separate concurring opinion in which he
agreed that the accused was entitled to a new trial. Justice McCaleb, in concurring,
also was of the view that the accused was entitled to a new trial, but on the
ground that the district attorney's remarks were an expression of his belief of the
defendant's guilt, based upon the defendant's demeanor and not solely upon evi-
dence adduced at the trial. In dissenting from a refusal to grant a rehearing,
Justice Hamiter was in accord with the views expressed by Justice McCaleb and
felt that a rehearing was necessary, since a majority of the court did not agree
that comment on the accused's failure to testify had been made. Justice Hawthorne
dissented.
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testify. In this respect the decision is in line with other prior
Louisiana jurisprudence. 9 However, questions such as the one
asked in the instant case give rise to other noteworthy problems.
The earliest appellate decision dealing with the admissibility
of the results of a lie detector test is Frye v. United States,10 de-
cided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
1923. In that case the court held that the lie detector had not yet
gained sufficient scientific recognition to justify the admission
of expert testimony in connection with its use. With rare excep-
tion 1 subsequent cases have followed this result. 12 It has been
suggested that the reasons given for excluding the result of the
lie detector test in the Frye case are not accurate today. 18 How-
ever, the overwhelming weight of authority is still to the effect
that the results of lie detector tests are inadmissible. 4 Innumer-
able cases at common law have applied the principle that inad-
missible evidence cannot be laid before a jury under the guise of
a question propounded to a witness.' 5 When the result is to plant
9. In State v. Delatte, 219 La. 715, 53 So.2d 906 (1951), the defendant was
on trial for theft of cattle. In his closing argument the district attorney stated:
"He can't explain by a single witness that has taken the witness stand where he
got those cattle from." On appeal the Supreme Court found no comment on the
failure of the defendant to testify. In State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893, 54 So.2d 137
(1951), the district attorney's remark that the evidence was uncontroverted and
uncontradicted was found to be proper argument. The statement made in State
v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So.2d 888 (1952) appears particularly difficult to
distinguish from that in the Hoover case. The defendant was on trial for bur-
glary and in his opening statement the district attorney declared: "Where was
Louis Bommarito that night? Nobody knows but Louis Bommarito and the police
officers." The Supreme Court found no direct or indirect reference to the failure
of the defendant to take the stand.
10. 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. See People v. Houser, 84 Cal. App.2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948), where the
results were admitted upon stipulation of both parties. In People v. Kenny, 167
N.Y. Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1938), an unappealed trial court case, the results
of a lie detector test were admitted over the objection of opposing counsel. How-
ever, this case must be considered in the light of a later New York trial court
case, People v. Forte, 167 N.Y. Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1938), where the court
refused to admit the results of a lie detector test.
12. Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. App. 1957); Lusby v.
State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 (1958) ; Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim.
45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951). See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
13. See Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22
TENif. L. REV. 711 (1953), where Dean Wicker comments on the finding in the
Frye case. "This statement is undoubtedly an accurate description of the status
of lie detector techniques in 1923. It is probably also accurate for the 1930's and
the early 1940's. However, it appparently does not accurately portray present day
standards, nor the developments likely to be projected within the next decade or
two." Id. at 723.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See 6 WiOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1808 (3d ed. 1940) and Annot., 109 A.L.R.
1089 (1937), and cases cited therein. In Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948), Justice Jackson points up the principle in noting that counsel was not
"asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury
box." It is interesting to note in this connection that the Canons of Ethics of
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undue prejudice in the minds of the jury, a new trial will be
granted. The cases which have been reversed for such conduct
of counsel fall into two general categories: (1) when the matter
contained in the question is so clearly inadmissible that it would
impeach "the legal learning of the attorney to say that he did not
know that they were manifestly improper and wholly unjusti-
fiable,"'16 or (2) when the inadmissibility of the matter alluded
to is not so clear, but counsel has been forewarned by an admon-
ishment from the court and persists in pursuing the same line of
questioning.'7 In both instances, of course, the court must de-
termine if the accused has suffered sufficient prejudice to war-
rant a new trial. The cases by no means afford a clear-cut rule
as to when instruction by the court will remove the prejudicial
effects flowing from an improper question. However, in the final
analysis the result should turn on whether or not the accused
has suffered incurable prejudice. Improper remarks of counsel
are generally held to be cured by instruction from the court,'s
except in extreme cases.19 Another point which should be con-
sidered in determining the prejudice suffered by a defendant
from an improper question is the effect his own objection might
have in the minds of the jury. It goes without saying that an
objection will frequently emphasize the fact suggested by the
question more effectively than if the objection were not made. 20
the Louisiana State Bar Association provide that "a lawyer shall not offer evidence
which he knows the Court should reject, in order to get the same before the jury
by arguments upon any point not properly calling for determination by him."
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF TILE LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, art. 14,
§ 22.
16. State v. Rhys, 40 Mont. 131, 132, 105 Pac. 494, 490 (1909); People v.
Jones, 293 Mich. 409, 292 N.W. 350 (1040). See Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1089 (1937).
17. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1808 (3d ed. 1940).
18. See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 784 (1933). In Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 141
A.2d 893 (1958), the prosecutrix in an incest case gave an affirmative answer
when questioned by the district attorney as to whether she had taken a lie de-
tector test. An objection to the question was sustained and the court charged the
jury to disregard. On appeal the instruction was held to have cured any prejudice
suffered by the accused. The objection made by the defense in the Lusby case put
the accused in not much better a position than the defendant in the instant case.
The jury would certainly be justified in inferring from defense's objection that he
did not desire the results of the tests revealed. This would ground the inference
that the tests were unfavorable to the accused. It is submitted that defense counsel
in the Lusby case would have profited more by making no objection at the time.
The question had already been answered and the objection only served as the basis
of the aforementioned inferences. Conversely, defense in the instant case could not
afford such tactics. The question had not been answered, and had he not objected
to the question when asked he would probably have been deemed to have waived
his objection.
19. See Comment, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 486 (1950), which deals with
the two most common types of incurable remarks in Louisiana: (1) a comment
on the defendant's failure to testify, and (2) appeals to racial prejudice.
20. For an illustration of the problem, see Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 522 (1851),
NOTES
An analysis of the instant case will aid in determining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant from the unanswered ques-
tion of whether he had been given a lie detector test. As a prac-
tical matter there are two inferences which a jury might draw
from such a question: (1) that the defendant has been requested
to submit to a lie detector test and has refused, or (2) that the
defendant has been given a lie detector test and is not willing to
reveal the results thereof. Either inference would take its toll
in prejudice against the accused. If the inferences are unfound-
ed, then the accused has a choice of either taking the stand to
correct them, in which case he may be cross examined upon the
whole of the case and impeached as any other witness,21 or re-
maining silent and suffering the prejudicial effects of the ques-
tion. A question such as that asked in the instant case may
achieve undesirable results even before trial. Having knowledge
that the question may be asked, the accused would be in a some-
what better position if he agreed to submit to a lie detector test
if so requested. Were the accused to refuse the test and the ques-
tion were asked, the undesirable inference of the defendant's re-
fusal to submit to the test could not be cured, even by his taking
the stand. Further, the defendant's objection to the question
would only serve to implant the matter more firmly in the minds
of the jury. On the other hand, if the defendant agrees to take
the test and the results are favorable to him, then in all proba-
bility the prosecution will refrain from referring to the test. If
the results of the test are unfavorable to the accused, he may still
escape the damaging effect of his own objection, because an af-
firmative answer to the question would dispel any inference as
to his refusal to take the test. Only in the event the prosecution
goes further and attempts to introduce the results of the test
would the objection giving rise to the above noted inferences have
to be interposed.
It is submitted that the court correctly concluded that the
question in the instant case did not amount to a comment on the
defendant's failure to take the stand. However, in the opinion
of the writer the case should not be interpreted as disposing of
the other issues presented in this Note. They were not stated as
where Lumpkin, J., in commenting upon a statement by the prosecutor that the
defendant's slave had confessed to his master's guilt, stated that the judge must
interfere without an objection by the opposing counsel; because the latter's objec-
tion is likely to be met by the offending counsel with the sarcastic turn, "Yes,
gentlemen, I have touched a tender spot, the galled jade will wince."
• 21. LA. R.S.. 15:376, 462 (1950).
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the basis of the objection or the motion for a mistrial in the lower
court and were not urged to the Supreme Court on appeal.
Hugh T. Ward
LABOR LAW - CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE ANTI-TRUST LAW AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Plaintiff, a union member, brought an action under the Ohio
anti-trust statute' to restrain a union and common carriers from
carrying out that part of a collective bargaining agreement
which prescribed minimum rentals for vehicles leased from
drivers. Plaintiff drove equipment which he owned and leased
to carriers on terms and conditions that differed substantially
from those of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff al-
leged that the fixing of prices at which the vehicles could be
leased violated the state anti-trust law by placing restrictions on
vehicles used in commerce. The defendant contended that the
contract provisions were to protect against leasing vehicles from
an owner-driver at a rental less than the actual cost of operation,
thereby making the driver apply part of his negotiated wage to
the operating expenses of the vehicle. The Ohio courts enjoined
the parties from giving effect to these minimum rental pro-
visions on the basis that the regulation was price fixing, which
violated the Ohio anti-trust law.2 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The objective of the mini-
mum rental provision was the protection of the negotiated wage
scale. The Ohio anti-trust law could not be applied to prevent
the contracting parties from carrying out their agreement on a
subject matter as to which the federal law directs them to bar-
gain. Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 79 S. Ct. 297 (U.S. 1959).
The power to regulate interstate commerce is delegated to
the federal government by the Constitution, and under this
power Congress has regulated the field of labor-management re-
lations. 4 Congress has not completely occupied the field, but has
1. OHIO RFV. CODE § 1331.01 (1953).
2. Appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a debatable
constitutional question. Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 167 Ohio St. 299, 147
N.E.2d 856 (1958).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4. Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1952); Taft-
Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1952). See NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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